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Rudolf carnap the elimination of metaphysics

Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) was a German-American philosopher mainly working in logic and philosophy of science.

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Rudolf Carnap (May 18, 1891 – September 14, 1970) was an influential philosopher who was active in central Europe before 1935 and in the United States thereafter. He was a leading member of the Vienna Circle and probably the most important advocate for logical positivism and the program of the Vienna Circle, at least in the United States. Carnap wrote an enormous amount, and he (and Carl Hempel) did more to work out the details of the logical positivist program and thereby promote that program in America and elsewhere than anyone else.

Harvard philosopher and logicianWillard Quine wrote, "Carnap is a towering figure. I see him as the dominant figure in philosophy from the 1930s onward, as Russell had been in the decades before...Some philosophers would assign this role rather to Wittgenstein, but many see the scene as I do."

Hempel wrote, "Carnap's ingenious and illuminating methods of logical analysis and reconstruction, and the example he has set in his own work of rigorous but openminded and undogmatic philosophical inquiry, have provided a powerful stimulus for a precise analytic approach to philosophical problems" (Qtd. in George 1967, back cover).

Life

Carnap was born in Ronsdorf, Germany into a north German family that had been humble unti

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Category:Rudolf Carnap

German philosopher leading logician (1891–1970)

Upload mediaName in abundance languageDate snatch birth18 Could 1891
Ronsdorf (Kingdom of Preussen, German Empire)Date of death14 September 1970
Santa MonicaCountry break on citizenshipResidenceEducated atDoctoral advisorDoctoral student

Abner Shimony
Robert Actress Palter
David Kaplan

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Rudolf Carnap

1. General Characterization of Carnap’s Philosophy

1.1 Rational Reconstruction and Explication

Carnap differed fundamentally from the western philosophical tradition in his conception of philosophy and his attitude toward philosophical problems. These supposed problems, he thought, were largely artifacts of our inadequate tools—they originate in confusions due to the languages our species has evolved over millennia to deal with the practical problems of a pre-scientific and pre-technological everyday life. These primitive tools leave us unequipped even to express, let alone to address, the traditional problems of philosophy coherently; our inherited languages distort the picture too badly, and to see things more adequately we need to devise new concepts and organize our thoughts in less parochial categories. Just as we have devised new concepts and vocabularies to find out about the world in systematic scientific inquiry, so we have to leave behind our traditional ways of articulating how everything fits together, how we should understand our place in the world, and how we should shape our lives in response.

So philosophical inquiry became, for Carnap, a kind of “conceptual engineering” (see Creath 1990, Flocke forthcoming-b) rather